On
October 11, Washington State's Supreme Court issued a decision perpetrating two
insidious canards that, like those ghastly movie goblins who return to haunt us
every Halloween season, simply refuse to die.
In Washington v. Gregory, that court held
Washington State's death penalty unconstitutional on grounds that (1) it was discriminatorily
applied to black murderers; and (2) failed to serve any "legitimate penological
goal" because it lacked any deterrent effect.
Because
the ruling was based on state law rather than the U.S. Constitution, it cannot
be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and is the final word on the death
penalty issue in Washington State.
The decision has little practical impact on Washington's death row
inmates, moreover, because that left-oriented state does not actually carry out
executions, even though state statutes still authorized capital
punishment.
But
the court's widely-reported opinion does have significant and disturbing
consequences because it reiterates two false legal and penological
doctrines that are mindlessly regurgitated in the media, in politics, and in
predominant elements of the legal and policy communities.
I
will not dwell here on the court's complete distortion and sophistry on the
deterrence issue. Authoritative studies
recorded elsewhere (e.g., by David Mulhausen of the Heritage Foundation), as
well as the most basic logic and common sense, establish that actual and timely enforcement of the
death penalty does have a significant
deterrent effect. Lenient or
long-delayed penalties have little chilling effect on potential perpetrators,
but, as Dr. Samuel Johnson famously said, "Depend upon it, sir, when a man
knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind
wonderfully."
Studies
and arguments to the contrary merely establish that capital punishment's
general deterrent effect is imperfect, not
futile. There are obviously categories of crazed, hardened, or furiously impassioned
persons who are immune to abstract deterrence.
But it has been demonstrated that each actual execution deters anywhere
from 3 to 18 murders, which is surely a "legitimate penological
objective."
Further, the heedless Washington court's deterrence analysis had another dispositive flaw: It failed to address the indisputable effect of specific deterrence. A duly executed and dead murderer is specifically and absolutely deterred from terrorizing or killing fellow inmates or prison staff, or from killing innocent citizens after a prison escape – tragic consequences that do in fact occur when murderers are not executed.
Further, the heedless Washington court's deterrence analysis had another dispositive flaw: It failed to address the indisputable effect of specific deterrence. A duly executed and dead murderer is specifically and absolutely deterred from terrorizing or killing fellow inmates or prison staff, or from killing innocent citizens after a prison escape – tragic consequences that do in fact occur when murderers are not executed.
But
the Washington court erred even more egregiously in its haphazard
"holding" that the death penalty is discriminatorily imposed on black
murderers in Washington.
The court rested this ruling on an ideologically-driven statistical study based upon a small data set (there were only 9 persons under sentence of death in Washington through 2016), substandard p-values, subjective coding of variables, and various "errors" recognized even by the court (decision at n. 7). Further, the study established barely marginal statistical significance even if accepted as valid. Indeed, the court inadvertently acknowledged the weakness of the decision's statistical underpinnings when it stated: "We make this determination by way of legal analysis, not pure science. . . . [W]e decline to require indisputably true science to prove that our death penalty is impermissibly imposed based on race." (decis pp. 21-22). Yet the decision rested squarely upon a highly abstruse, but patently flawed, statistical study rather than on direct evidence of discrimination. In other words, it rested on "impure science" of the most questionable kind.
Worst of all, the decision didn't even purport to establish that any actual discrimination motivated the sentencing of the murderer Gregory in his own case. It adopted the absurd proposition that the constitutionality of a criminal defendant's sentence depends upon the statistical patterns deciphered by social scientists in past cases rather than the gruesome particulars of the defendant's individual crime.
The court rested this ruling on an ideologically-driven statistical study based upon a small data set (there were only 9 persons under sentence of death in Washington through 2016), substandard p-values, subjective coding of variables, and various "errors" recognized even by the court (decision at n. 7). Further, the study established barely marginal statistical significance even if accepted as valid. Indeed, the court inadvertently acknowledged the weakness of the decision's statistical underpinnings when it stated: "We make this determination by way of legal analysis, not pure science. . . . [W]e decline to require indisputably true science to prove that our death penalty is impermissibly imposed based on race." (decis pp. 21-22). Yet the decision rested squarely upon a highly abstruse, but patently flawed, statistical study rather than on direct evidence of discrimination. In other words, it rested on "impure science" of the most questionable kind.
Worst of all, the decision didn't even purport to establish that any actual discrimination motivated the sentencing of the murderer Gregory in his own case. It adopted the absurd proposition that the constitutionality of a criminal defendant's sentence depends upon the statistical patterns deciphered by social scientists in past cases rather than the gruesome particulars of the defendant's individual crime.
Rather
than wrestling with the convoluted "p-values" and subjective
regression analysis that produced its improbable conclusion – i.e., that the
extremely progressive polity, government, and judiciary of Washington State
collectively discriminate against blacks in capital sentencing – the court could have
consulted objective and factual national death penalty data that are
glaringly inconsistent with its decision. Those data show that the death penalty is, and
has long been, imposed disproportionately on whites, not blacks.
In
short, the court's race-based decision was not merely wrong; it was the
opposite of the truth.
The
Justice Department's Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) carefully monitors the
administration of capital punishment in all states on an annual basis. Its most recent report, Capital Punishment, 2016, was published in April 2018 (there is a
lag in the annual BJS reports due to the difficulties in collecting and
collating the data). The 2016 Report
found: "Of the 20 prisoners
executed [in 2016], 18 were white (2
of Hispanic origin) and 2 were black
[emphasis added]." BJS further
reported: "Among prisoners under
sentence of death at year-end in 2016, a total of 55% were white and 42% were
black."
The
fact that executions of whites in 2016 exceeded execution of blacks by 9 to 1 was no glaring aberration. An earlier BJS Report in 2013 tabulated executions
by race from 1977 to 2013 (Capital
Punishment 2013, Table 11). For the
entire 35-year period covered, there were 770 executions of whites (57%) and
464 of blacks (34%). In 2013, it was 23
whites versus 13 blacks executed. In
2012, it was 25 whites, 11 blacks. And
so on through the years. The last year
in which black executions exceeded white was 1991 – 27 years ago – when there were 7 blacks executed versus 6 whites. During this entire 35-year period, there were
only two years (1989 and 1991) in which more blacks were executed that whites.
Advocates
of the discriminatory death penalty canard might, and do, argue that such data fails
to account for the fact that blacks constitute only 13% of the U.S. population
but account for well more than 13% of executions (i.e., 34% of executions
during the era covered by the 2013 BJS Report).
That argument is futile, however, because the relevant population for
this comparison is not the general population,
but the population of those who alone are
eligible for the death penalty – murderers.
Under U.S. constitutional law, only those who commit murder are eligible
for the death penalty.
The
FBI's recurring reports on Crime in the United States establish that blacks
consistently represent over 50% of murderers in the United States. During the 28-year era covered by the FBI's
2011 Homicide Trends report (1980 to 2008), 52.5% of U.S. homicides were
committed by blacks while 43.5% were committed by whites (NCJ 236018, Table
7). More current FBI reports confirm
this pattern. In 2016, for example, 53.5% of murder offenders in cases where
the race was known were black (2016, Crime in the United States, Overview). For 2017, the figure was 54.2% (6,444 black
murder offenders out of 11,883 such offenders where race was known) (2017,
Crime in the United States, Table 3).
These
straightforward figures speak with a decisive clarity that exposes the
Washington court's tortured manipulation of reality for the sophistry that it
is. Objective BJS and FBI data establish
that while black perpetrators commit slightly more than 50% of U.S. murders,
they represent only about one-third (and in 2016, only 10%) of those who are
ultimately executed for their murders.
The same data establishes that white murderers are therefore about twice
as likely as blacks to be executed in the United States.
Unless sentencing decision-makers in
Washington State are driven by an element of anti-black discrimination that
is not manifest in the nationwide administration of capital punishment, the
Washington Supreme Court's decision in the Gregory
case is demonstrably and dangerously wrong.